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EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND: A CONTENTION-ORIENTED APPROACH' 
Gregory M. Malley. Michael A. McCarthy. alld Grace 8. Yukich' 
In canlrasl /0 prevalent theories of terrorism, this study develops a contenlion-oriented 
approach where levels and/orms a/puli/ical violence againsl civilians depend upon: (I) the 
sirolegies 0/ combatoms; (1) the means of contention; (3) Ihe localions of alUes and 
opponenlS; (4) Ihe colleclive identities of combOfoms: and (5) the dynamics of contention, 
incltlding whether or nol represenlUlives of paramilitary organi=ations are included ;n formal 
peace processes. Quantilalive analyses of a muJti-Jourcc database of civilian deaths taking 
place ;n Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 offer preliminary support for this approach. 
The study underscores Ihe insights provided by theories and melhodf used in Ihe fields of 
social movemenls research and peace and conflici slUdies. 
The concept of terrorism is deeply emotive, power-laden, and contested. Thus, the frequent use 
of the term ''terror'' in public discourse provides an opportunity for academic research to 
resonate with the pUblic. Yet, use of the tenn in research runs the danger of scholarly work 
legitimating the agendas of the powerful while overlooking oppression as an underlying source 
of insurgency. It also runs the risks of glossing over variations in the actors responsible for 
political violence against civilians as well as differences in the motivations of those responsible. 
These dangers and risks are evidenced by the ad-hoc analyses found in the 9/11 literature. Much 
of this work is based on theories that have been discredited in the fields of social movement 
research and peace and conflict studies. 
In contrast, this article calls for a contention-oriented approach to understanding political 
violence against civilians. We conceptualize four distinct types of political violence against 
civilians-selective, collective, categorical, and indiscriminate. Moreover, we argue that five 
facets of contention help to explain variations in the levels and fonns of political violence 
against civilians: (I) the strategies of combatants; (2) the means of contention; (3) the locations 
of allies and opponents; (4) the collective identities of combatants; and (5) the dynamics of 
contention, including dynamics related to peace processes. Quantitative analyses of lethal 
political violence against civilians in Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 are used to 
illustrate the utility of the four-part typology. as well as to assess hypotheses regarding factors 
influencing each type of political violence against civilians. The analyses largely support our 
hypotheses, underscoring the promise of a contention-oriented approach. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES BEYOND "TERROR" 
Scholars have developed a myriad of definitions of terror that variously emphasize the per-
petrator of violence, the target of violence, and the intent of violence. We argue that because 
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of a lack of definitional consensus, the pejorat ive character of the term, and challenges in its 
operationalization, researchers should use the lenn political violence instead of terrorism. 
Several scholars limit perpetrators of terror to nonstate actors (see, for example, Sommier 
2002; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Black 2004; LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Others, how-
ever, point out that states also commit acts of terror against civilians (Herman and O'Sullivan 
1989; Gareau 2004; Goodwin 2006; Drake 2007; Froystad 2009). Defining political violence 
against civilians by noostate actors as terrorism and political violence against civilians by 
slate actors as something other than terrorism serves to delegitimate the actions of insurgents 
while legitimating the actions of state actors (San Juan, Jr. 2005; Butko 2006). It reinforces 
the taken-for-granted assumption that states rightfully have a monopoly over organized 
violence and use that monopoly for the good of their citizens. By using the term " terrorism" to 
only refer to the actions of noostate actors, scholars are contributing to a dominant discourse 
that symbolically and strategically gives advantages to powerful actors (Woehrle, Coy, and 
Maney 2008). Subtly reinforcing the legitimacy of the state could be problematic when the 
state engages in human rights abuses against civilians who, in tum, rebel against the state. 
Such distinctions also lead us in lhe wrong direction in understanding political violence 
against civilians. Some states commit extensive po litical violence against civilians to inspire 
fear and terror (Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer n.d. ; Cohen and Corrado 2005; Gill 2007; Maher and 
Peterson 2008 ; Seri 2008; Froystad 2009). Using different labels to describe political violence 
against civilians by state actors versus nonstate actors precludes the exploration of possible 
similarities in the causes of the same behavior (Goodwin 2007).' 
A greater degree of agreement exists regarding victims of terrorism, with most scholars 
limiting victims to civilians (see, for instance, Sommier 2002; Carr 2003 ; Bergesen and 
Lizardo 2004; Black 2004; Butko 2006; Goodwin 2006; Drake 2007; LaFree and Ackerman 
2009). Yet the term civilian often remains undefined. As will be discussed in detail below, 
many actors outside the state are actively engaged in political contention, some of which is 
violent, either in opposition to or in defense of the state. Moreover. extreme acts of violence 
against combatants can also be intended to inspire fear. 
This brings us to the use of intent in defining terrorism. Some scholars have defined terror 
as acts that either are intended to cause or actually do cause feelings of terror in one or more 
audiences (Walzer 2004; LaFree and Ackerman 2009). Jeff Goodwin (2006), however, points 
out that several definitions of terrorism do not refer to the intent or effect of inspiring terror or 
fear (Tilly 2004; Crenshaw 1981 ; Black 2004; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). Assuming that 
political violence against civilians is always motivated by a desire to instill fear is 
questionable. Civilians may be terrorized by an act of political violence without this being the 
intent of the perpetrator. Given the necessity of sublimating these feelings to both create and 
cope with contexts of high levels of political violence, establishing what people actually feel 
about acts of political violence is difficult methodo logically, not to mention problematic 
ethically in terms of the rights of human subjects. 
Given these multiple limitations, we argue that sociologists should use the concept of 
political violence instead of terrorism. When compared to the concept of terrorism, the 
concept of political violence sensitizes analysts to variations in perpetrators, victims, intent. 
and consequences. At the same time, the tenn political emphasizes that the organized violence 
is committed in the pursuit of challenging or defending extant authoriiy (Snow, Soule, and 
Kriesi 2004). As such, it avoids the tendency of pejorative terms like terrorism to portray 
those engaged in organized violence as unthinking and unreasoned and, therefore, incapable 
of being persuaded through education or negotiation. 
The Ghosts a/Theories Past: Explaining Political Violence against Civilians 
While moving away from the concept of terrorism, it is nonetheless important to 
understand political violence against nonstate actors. Nonstate actors are more likely to be 
Polilical Violence in Northern Ireland 29 
casualties of modem and postmodem warfare than are state actors (Azam 2006). Moreover, 
many "civilians" play important roles in political violence, either directly through participation 
in combat or indirectly through material and moral support for combatants (Gross 2009). 
Given the prominence of Charles Tilly's work in the field, there has been a rather puz-
zling neglect of political violence by social movement researchers. Perhaps because of this 
neglect, much of the recent research on political violence against civilians by scholars in the 
fields of terrorism studies, security studies, and criminology draw from theories that have 
largely been discredited within the field of collective behavior and social movements. Some 
scholars have drawn on functionalism and early collective behavior theories to explain 
terrorism. Agnew (20 I 0), for instance, has advanced a strain-based explanation. Gottschalk 
and Gottschalk (2004) attribute terrorism by nonstate actors in the Middle East to their 
authoritarian tendencies and pathological hatred. The authors explicitly reject rational motives 
for their actions. Explanations rooted in deprivation theory have also featured prominently 
(Senechal de la Roche 1996; Stem 2003; Black 2004). 
Just as these theories were applied to innovative social movements threatening the power 
status quo in the 1950s and 1960s, they are now being applied to similarly innovative move-
ments. That studies of "terrorism" in the immediate aftermath of 911 1 have largely stig-
matized insurgents and ignored political repression and structural violence as sources of 
armed conflict is hardly surprising. What is surprising is that social movement scholars have 
yet to apply contemporary theories and rigorous methods of research to challenge these 
studies. More recent social movement scholarship has much to offer in increasing our under-
standing of political violence against civilians. In this article we put forth a contention-
oriented approach that emphasizes the goals, identities, strategies, and interactions among 
those involved, either directly or indirectly, in content jon. 
A Contention-Oriented Approach 
We propose four categories of political violence that separate civilian victims based upon 
the nature and extent of their proximity to contention- selective, collateral, categorical. and 
indiscriminate. Goodwin (2006) distinguishes between selective and categorical political 
violence against civilians. Selective political violence against civilians involves political 
violence against specific nonstate actors targeted because of their perceived or actual be-
haviors. "Civilians" frequently participate directly in violent contention as members of police 
or military auxiliaries and reserves, militias, vigilante groups, and paramilitary organizations 
(Romero 2000; Branch 2005; Gross 2009). Some civilians become directly involved in less 
formal ways, such as participating in fights and riots that are politically related. Other 
civilians, while not directly participating in political violence, are seen as supporting it. 
Civilians also play a variety of other roles in political contention, including those of non-
violent activists, office holders, members of political parties, groups, or associations, in-
fonnants, collaborators. provocateurs, fund raisers and financial supporters, service providers, 
outspoken lawyers. investigative journalists, and propagandists-to name a few . As such, it is 
often erroneous to assume that all civilians are "innocent" in the sense that they have not 
played a role in contention. 
As political violence escalates, civilians are routinely pressured into becoming involved 
in contention. A failure to either support or to oppose participants can result in a civilian being 
targeted for violence. For example, civilians can be targeted simply for fraternizing with op-
posing combatants or complicit civilians. The act of "crossing over" is viewed as a betrayal-
a violation of group commitment worthy of violent expiation (Maney 2005; Maney, Ibrahim, 
Higgins, and Herzog 2006). At other times, simply refusing to provide support requested by 
combatants can be grounds for being altacked. Lronically, the refusal to become involved in 
contention becomes a source of selective political violence. Moreover, persons who witness 
unlawful contentious acts and, therefore, threaten to bring about the incarceration or execution 
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of combatants are likely to be targeted. In these ways, violent political contention colonizes 
the civilian population, decreasing the number of non-engaged persons. 
Selective political violence includes not only targeting civilians because of their political 
roles, but also targeting civilians because of other roles and bebaviors such as common 
criminal behaviors or personally offending one or more individuals participating in armed 
contention. Increased antisocial behaviors are a frequent by-product of the reduced ability of 
the state to enforce laws in insurgent strongholds. At the same time, paramilitary organi-
zations and civil defense committees develop capacities to enforce ru les through organized 
violence. Doing so often enhances the legitimacy of these actors in areas they relied on for 
providing members and support. In assuming the roles and functions of authorities, these 
actors in effect develop provisional governments. This is particularly important in signaling 
tangible progress toward revolutionary goals. In other instances, apolitical deviance is nega-
tively sanctioned for political reasons. For instance, some paramilitary organizations fund 
their operations through drug dealing and/or bank robberies. Killing apolitical drug dealers 
and bank robbers effectively eliminates competition for resources used to fund paramilitary 
operations. 
In addition to selectively targeting perceived criminals, individual combatants sometimes 
take advantage of their access to weaponry and relative protection from reprisal to act on 
grudges against acquaintances. For instance, studies of the Rwandan genocide reveal that many 
of the victims were murdered by those with wbom they previously had disputes (Brubaker 
and Laitin 1998). Having theorized reasons why civilians are killed because of their perceived 
or actual behaviors, we now tum to explaining why civilians are targeted for no reason other 
than their social group affiliation. 
In contrast to selective political violence, categorical political violence against civilians 
is political violence targeting nons tate actors because of their perceived or actual affiliation 
with a specific collectivity, regardless of whether or not they are involved in contention 
(Goodwin 2006). Collective bases for categorical political violence frequently include, but 
certainly are not limited to, ethnicity, religion, race, nationality, and social class. The colon· 
izing logic of political contention also helps us to understand the tendency to view most, if not 
all, members of a collectivity as being complicit in contention. Moreover, creating strong 
discursive, relational, and physical boundaries with an opposing group facilitates the devel-
opment of a strong movement identity and, in tum, high levels of active participation in the 
struggle (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Maney et a!. 2006; White 20 10). Ethnonationalist iden-
tities are particularly likely to be characterized by strong boundaries. All people are seen to be 
members of a nation by virtue of their shared cultural characteristics and/or demonstrations of 
national loyalty. Each member of the nation has rights that those who are not part of the 
nation do not have. These rights come with responsibilities to the nation ; above all, the 
responsibility to take up arms in its defense. From the perspective of those holding such 
assumptions, it is impossible to conceive of a member of a nation who is not complicit in anned 
ethnonationalist struggle. 
We propose two additional, distinct types of political violence against civilians: collateral 
political violence and indiscriminate political violence. Collateral political violence against 
civilians involves political violence against nons tate actors that results inadvertently from 
operations targeting other individuals believed to have played past or present roles in political 
contention. Those civilians who experience this type of violence are not the intended targets.' 
There is still another type of political violence against civilians that has yet to be cate-
gorized: political violence against civi1ians who have no behavioral, physical, relational, or 
communal connection to contention. In other words, civilians who are targeted (as opposed to 
being collateral damage) are not perceived as playing either direct or indirect individual roles 
in contention and do not belong to a specific collectivity involved in the conflict. We refer to 
this phenomenon as indiscriminate political violence against civilians. Those without involve-
ment or perceived complicity in political contention are the targets.) 
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We argue that behavioral, physical, and relational proximity of civilians to contention 
increases the likelihood that they will be the victims of political violence. Accordingly, we 
expect that indiscriminate political violence against civilians takes place the least among the 
four types (H I; see Appendix A for a list of all hypotheses). From a contention-oriented per-
spective, blind violence against civilians should be a relatively rare occurrence. A contention-
oriented perspective also suggests that portrayals of civilian killings as mostly being 
categorical political violence motivated solely by sectarian hatreds ignore the likely preval-
ence of political violence based upon the behaviors of targeted civilians, as well as their 
physical proximity to contention. By virtue of their perceived influence on the outcome of 
contention, civilians participating in political contention are most likely to be targeted for 
violence by those seeking to eliminate their participation and (by example) similar partici-
pation by other civilians. To a lesser extent and as a byproduct of contention, we expect to see 
civilians targeted either because of their perceived common criminal behaviors or to carry out 
personal vendettas. In addition, civilians in close proximity to selective political violence are 
frequently caught in the crossfire, metaphorically and often literally. Participants in contention 
are often heavily guarded. It is also not uncommon for participants to surround themselves 
with civilians who serve as "human shields." After detening or eliminating civilian oppo-
nents, we assume that strategic-minded actors have the greatest interest in deterring or 
eliminating those providing material and moral support to these opponents. Accordingly, we 
expect that over the course of a cycle of contention that selective and collateral political vio-
lence will constitute large percentages of civilian victims (H2). 
Having differentiated between four different types of political violence against civilians, 
we now theorize the causes of these phenomena. As part of a contention-oriented approach 
emphasizing the agency of participants (Jasper 2004), we argue that the levels and types of 
political violence against civilians depend in no small part upon the strategies of combatants. 
Strategies of Combatants 
Levels and types of political.violence against civilians are likely to reflect plans of action 
for achieving the goals of the combatants within a given context. For example, both categor-
ical and indiscriminate political violence can reflect a deliberate strategy of destabilization on 
the part of insurgents. In a colonial context, the financial costs to the state may provide 
sufficient incentive to territorially withdraw or separate. In the context of class-based conflict, 
the elimination of capital could be viewed as paving the way toward alternative forms of 
economic production. For insurgents not concerned with popular legitimacy, indiscriminate 
political violence can represent an attempt to eliminate mobilization on behalf of the state by 
civilians regardless of their social group affiliations. Accordingly, we hypothesize that major 
changes in the strategies of combatants are likely to lead to significant changes in the levels 
and types of political violence perpetrated against civilians (H3). The strategies of armed 
contention selected, in turn, depend upon factors familiar to social movement scholars, in-
cluding the means of contention, assessments of allies and opponents, the collective identities 
of participants, and interactions among contenders (Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger, 
and Goodwin 20 I 2). 
Means of Contention 
The means of contention influence the likelihood of political violence against civilians. 
Benini and Moulton (2004) find that civilians in Afghanistan were killed as the indirect 
effects of munitions used by allied forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Home 
(2002) and Sommier (2002) both argue that new military resources and technologies increase 
the capacity for destruction and, therefore, the likelihood of indiscriminate violence. 
Some technologies for killing are less discriminating than others. In particular, explosives 
and plane crashes are more likely to result in higher numbers of civilian casualties compared 
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to fists, rocks, knives, or bullets. As a result, relative access to different types of weaponry 
will greatly influence levels of political violence against civilians. In this regard, we expect 
that the increased availability of less discriminating weaponry increases all forms of political 
violence against civilians (H4). The availability of weaponry and other resources depends 
upon the presence and degree of support from those not directly participating in contention. 
Allies and Opponents 
Goodwin (2007: 2027) defmes complicit civilians as noncombatants who benefit from, 
support, or have substantial capacity to influence opposing actors. He hypothesizes that 
categorical political violence against civilians is most likely to occur when opposing actors 
think that it is unlikely that they can draw support from complicit civilians. These actors are 
thought to be more likely to hold these perceptions in three contexts: (I) complicit civilians 
support extensive political violence; (2) complicit civilians are numerous and relatively un-
protected; and (3) political alliances or cooperation between the political actor and the 
civilians in question are weak or absent due to strong linguistic, religious, and/or territorial 
segregation (Goodwin 2007: 2039-40). This leads us to expect that civilians in areas pro-
viding high levels of support for an armed actor are more likely to be victims of categorical 
political violence (H5). 
Collective Identities 0/ Combatants 
Levels of categorical violence against civilians can also be influenced by the collective 
identities of participants (Bhatt 20 I 0). The perception of the potential of complicit civilians to 
be potential supporters of combatants is not only a product of social distance and history, but 
also very much a product of collective identity. The collective identities of some political 
actors may prevent them from engaging in high levels of political violence against complicit 
civilians, even when each of these three contextual factors discussed in the preceding sub-
section are present. State actors may seek to demobilize, if not convert, complicit civilians by 
arguing that they are citizens guaranteed equal rights and equal protection by the state. To 
engage in categorical political violence against these civilians would violate a rule of behavior 
and group commitment that could be central to the collective identity and/or discursive 
strategy of state building. Moreover, it would likely not only further de-legitimate the state 
but also intensify levels of both participation in and support for insurgents. 
Nonstate political actors may eschew categorical political violence for similar reasons. 
They may construct their collective identities as being inclusive of all nonstate actors even 
when civilians draw strong identity bnundaries between themselves and the insurgents. To 
engage in categorical terrorism would violate a fundamental rule of behavior and group 
commitment (that is, it would be transgressive from the perspective of the insurgents). 
Accordingly, we expect that combatants with more inclusive collective identities will be less 
likely to engage in categorical political violence than combatants with more exclusive 
collective identities (H6). Nonetheless, strong identity commitments may not be sufficient to 
constrain political violence against civilians in response to provocation. 
Dynamics o/Contention 
Interactions among combatants often contribute to changes in both the levels and types of 
political violence against civilians. An escalation in political violence by one actor is likely to 
be reciprocated by opponents in an effort to raise the costs of such behaviors (Herman and 
O'Sullivan 1989; Maney 2005; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009; Ukiwo 2009). In the process, 
a tit-for-tat dynamic ensues, often culminating in an outward spiral of political violence. 
Specific types of political violence against civilians are likely to be reciprocated, particularly 
when they have the capacities and are not constrained by identity-based commitments. At a 
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certain point, as civilian casualties rapidly mount, one or more of the actors may deliberately 
reduce their violence against civilians in the hopes that others will follow suil. Because of this 
tendency toward tactical convergence, we expect that major, sustained increases or decreases 
in political violence against civilians by an armed actor are likely to be reciprocated by 
opponents (H7). 
Peace processes can constitute efforts to de-escalate armed conflict. Those participating 
in peace processes mostly reduce their levels of political violence against both combatants and 
civilians. However, there are occasions where participants engage in efforts to increase their 
bargaining leverage at the negotiating table (Kriesberg 1995; Darby and MacGinty 2003-). 
Moreover, for those armed actors not participating-either by involuntary exclusion or 
voluntary refusal- peace processes are also likely to increase their categorical political 
violence as they seek to undermine public support by heightening polarization, mistrust, and 
uncertainty (Stedman 1997; Darby 2001 ; Newman and Richmond 2006). Accordingly, we 
expect categorical political violence to increase during peace processes largely exclusive of 
paramilitary organizations and to decrease during peace processes mostly inclusive of 
paramilitary organizations (HS). 
METHODOLOGY 
Quantitative methodologies lend themselves to establishing variations in types of political 
violence against civilians. Unfortunately, most studies have either examined political violence 
without distinguishing between civilian and combatant status or have failed to differentiate 
between different types of political violence. This absence can be largely attributed to two 
factors. First, detailed infonnation on the circumstances and motives surrounding civilian 
killings is often difficult to obtain. Second, such information tends to be deeply disputed 
given its implications for the relative legitimacy of the actors involved in contention. 
This article examines political violence against civilians in Northern Ireland between 
1966 and 2006 (see Appendix B for a glossary of case-related terminology). Created through 
an act of parliament, a peace treaty, and force of arms in the early I 920s, Northern Ireland is a 
distinct political entity, comprising six of the thirty-two counties of the island of Ireland. It is 
constitutionally linked with Great Britain as part of the United Kingdom. The other twenty-six 
counties of Ireland are known as the Republic of Ireland, which was declared a sovereign, 
independent republic in the constitution of 1937 and reaffirmed by an act of parliament in 
1949. In 1966, the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising, Loyalists feared an upsurge in 
Republican attacks and undertook a series ofraodom killings of Nationalists, led by the newly 
formed paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force. In 1965, mass civil rights 
mobilization placed pressure upon the British state to force the Unionist-controlled Northern 
Ireland state to redress the Nationalist population's grievances. Widespread rioting and the 
subsequent introduction of British soldiers on the streets of Northern Ireland in August, 1969, 
marked the beginning of a rapid escalation in political violence. The year 1972 brought the 
highest level of politi cally related fatalities that Northern Ireland had ever experienced. Levels 
of political violence declined markedly after 1976 with a number of subsequent spikes, 
particularly during the hunger strikes of the early 19S0s and the beginning of the peace 
process that led to the signing and ratification of the Belfast "Good Friday" Agreement in 
1998. While the killing of civilians by Northern Ireland security forces largely ended in the 
mid-1990s, both Loyalist and dissident Republican paramilitaries continue these practices. 
We believe that the Northern Ireland is an ideal case for advancing our understanding of 
political violence against civilians. It is arguable that the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland have 
received more scholarly and media attention than any other ethnonationalist conflict. As a 
result, detailed documentation exists 00 most civilian killings, allbwiog for their classification 
into one of the four categories of political violence discussed above. The existence of multiple 
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sources of data on civilian killings allows for both greater detail and greater confidence 
regarding classification. For this anicle, we used the following data sources: Sullon 200 I; 
Conflict Archive on the Internet nd; McKeown 2009; McKittrick 2004; findings by the 
Independent Monitoring Commission 2004-2006; repons of the Police Service of Nonhern 
Ireland Historical Enquiries Team 2005 to present; rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights; and the Saville Inquiry Report released in 2010. Moreover, in contrast to other cases 
of anned conflict, month and year-level time-series data exists for several measures that can 
help us to assess contextual factors influencing the prevalence of different forms of terrorism 
against civilians. Findings on the basis of one case are preliminary and exploratory. However, 
given the absence of this type of research, coupled with the influence of Northern Ireland 
upon other ethoonationalist conflicts, the findings will provide an important first step toward 
the rigorous analysis of political violence against civilians. 
Disaggregaling Political Violence agains t Civilians 
Each instance of a politically motivated killing of a civilian was classified into one of five 
motivational categories: (I) selective political violence; (2) collateral political violence; (3) 
categorical political violence; (4) indiscriminate political violence; or (5) uncertain. A death 
was coded as selective political violence if the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
civilian was killed because of either her or his perceived or actual individual identity, role, or 
behavior (for example, combatant; excombatant; political activist; common criminal). A death 
was coded as collateral political violence if the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
person killed was not the intended target. A death was coded as categorical political violence 
if the perpetrator had no apparent reason to kill the targeted civilian other than her or his 
ethnonationalist affiliation. While some Protestants favor reunification and some Catholics 
favor Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom, they consti tute very small minor-
ities. Accordingly, Protestants are used as a proxy measure for Unionists and Catholics for 
Nationalists. A death was coded as indiscriminate political violence if the civilian killed was: 
(I) of the same ethnonationalist affiliation; (2) not killed because of their individual identity, 
role, or behavior; and (3) not the victim of collateral political violence. Seventy-seven deaths 
were placed in an "uncertain" category and excluded from the analysis due to: (I) insufficient 
information; (2) the absence of a majority or definitive opinion among the sources regarding 
the perpetrator and motivation for the killing; or (3) multiple motivations for the killing, thus 
preventing the exclusive assignment of the case to one of the four categories. 
Killings were also classified in one of four general perpetrating actor categories: ( I) 
Northern Ireland security forces; (2) Loyalist-affiliated individuals or organizations; (3) a 
combination of Northern Ireland security forces and Loyalist-affiliated individuals or organi-
zations; and (4) Republican-affiliated individuals or organizations. It is possible that some of 
the cases have been erroneously classified. Intersource validation coupled with the large 
number of cases, however, provides a high degree of confidence in the validity of the aggre-
gated findings. 
We used Cohen'S kappa as a measure to assess the rate of inter-coder agreement among 
the three coders. A sample of 300 cases coded by two of the coders in all possible dyadic 
combinations yielded a combined kappa score of 0.63. This score is generally considered to 
indicate a substantial rate of agreement among the coders (see Landis and Koch 1977; Sirn 
and Wright 2005). The data enable us to assess the relative engagement in different types of 
political violence against civilians by different political actors over the course of the Troubles. 
Conlextualizing Political Violence agaimt Civilians 
We examine factors possibly influencing levels and types of political violence against 
civilians. To do this, we ran time-series and logistic regressions of the number of killings 
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within the category on selected independent variables (see Appendix C for a discussion of 
regression diagnostics and remedies). All independent variables in time-series regressions 
were lagged . Independent variables were selected on the basis of their operationalization of 
concepts used in hypotheses along with the availability of continuous time-series data. 
Strategy of Combatants 
To assess whether shifts in paramilitary strategy affect levels and types of political 
violence against civilians, we created dummy variables for three distinct strategic phases of 
the armed Republican Struggle during the Troubles: an all out offensive strategy by the Pro-
visionallrish Republican Army (IRA) after the split of the republican movement; the adoption 
of the long war strategy after a ceasefire and negotiations with the British government in 1975 
and 1976; and the TUAS Strategy articulated in an internal Republican document believed to 
have been circulated in 1994 before being leaked in 1995 (see English 2002; Moloney 2002; 
White 2006). TUAS is widely thuught tu stand fur either Tactical Use uf Armed Struggle or 
Totally Unarmed Strategy. We expect categorical violence by Republicans to be highest 
during the all out offensive and lowest during the TUAS phase. 
Means of Contention 
We hypothesized that the availability of different types of weaponry would affect levels 
of political violence against civilians. Accordingly, in month-level time series regression anal-
yses, we include measures of the number of shooting incidents, as well as the number of 
explosive devices used. The data come from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, Report of the 
Chief Constable, and the Police Service Northern Ireland's Statistic's branches website. Per 
Robert White (J 993), month level figures are estimated by apportioning changes between the 
year level data over a 12-month period. 
Allies and Opponents 
We created dummy variables for whether or not the location where a civilian was killed 
was a loyalist paramilitary stronghold or a republican paramilitary stronghold. We compiled a 
list of Republican strongholds from the geographically based brigade and battalion structure 
of the Provisional IRA prior to its reorganization in 1977, and a list of the home residences of 
current Republican prisoners supplied by the Sinn Fein POW Department. Given declining 
participation upon the adoption of the Long War strategy, locations in the Republic of Ireland 
coded as Republican strongholds prior to December 3, 1977 (the date of a change in the IRA's 
Chief of Staff) were not coded as Republican strongholds after December 2, 1977. Similarly, 
we compiled a list of Loyalist strongholds based upon the brigade areas of the Ulster Defence 
Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. 
Collective Identities of Combatants 
Drawing upon the same sources used to categorize types of political vio lence against 
civilians, we created variables limiting political violence to one of the following perpetrators: 
Loyalists, RepUblicans, or security forces. Because Republican identity is more inclusive of 
Protestants than Loyalist identity is inclusive of Catholics, we expect Republicans to engage 
in less categorical political violence than Loyalists. 
Dynamics of Contention 
To get at the possibility of the emergence of a tit-for-tat dynamic, the number of killings 
by opposing political actors was included in certain time-series regression analyses. The de-
pendent variable was also lagged to provide a measure of a sustained campaign. To assess 
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whether or not opponents would reciprocate dc-escalation, we created a binary variable for 
whether or not a cease fire by the Provisional IRA was in effecl. The Akaike Information Cri-
terion was used to determine the appropriate lag for each model. 
Above we argued that peace processes are likely to have different effects upon violence 
against civilians depending upon whether or not paramilitary organizations are included in the 
negotiations. Accordingly, we created two binary variables: one for peace processes that were 
exclusive of Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organizations (such as the Sunningdale 
negotiations and Agreement; the Constitutional Convention; the first Northern Ireland Assem-
bly; and the Anglo-Irish Agreement), and the other for the negotiations, signing, and ratifi-
cation through referenda of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement (BGFA). The BGFA process 
was the first and only peace process during the Troubles to include representatives of Loyalist 
and Republican paramilitary organizations. 
Control Measures 
Taking the lead from White (1993), unadjusted employment rates were included as a 
measure of deprivation in month-level time series regression analyses. The data come from 
three sources: the Digest of Statistics, the Annual Abstract of Statistics, and a report by the 
Northern Ireland Statistical Researcb Agency. Discrepancies existed between figures for the 
same yean; provided by different sources. Accordingly, figures were weighted using ratios to 
standardize the data. 
Again taking the lead from White (1993), as a general measure of repressive capacity we 
used Annual Abstract of Statistics, Report of the Chief Constable, and the Police Service 
Northern Ireland's Statistic's branches website to compile tbe number of security forces in 
Northern Ireland in a given year. Given the findings by several quantitative studies of a 
curvilinear relationship between repression and insurgency, we also include a squared tenn in 
the regression model. 
RESULTS 
Table I disaggregates civilian deaths by four types of political violence against civilians by 
the agent responsible. The findings support our first two hypotheses (again, see Appendix A 
for a list of hypotheses). Of the four categories of political violence against civilians, 
indiscriminate killings account for the lowest percentage of fatalities (3.0 perceOl). Even with 
the Provisional IRA's largeting of businesses as part of its economic destabilization efforts in 
the early 1970s, only 4.3 percent of civilians who lost their lives to Republican violence were 
killed indiscriminately. Whether due to the desire not to alienate constituencies, a deep 
identification with their co-nationals, or a combination of material and symbolic factors, in-
discriminate political violence was not a prominent pan of the repertoire of anned contention 
during the Troubles. 
The Troubles were often portrayed as a sectarian conflict where civilians were mostly 
killed for no reason other than their ethnonationalist amliation . If this were the case, then 
categorical violence should account for the majority of civilian deaths. Table I, however, 
reveals that selective and collateral political violence together accounted for 61 percent of 
civilian deaths. Almost half lbe time (48 percent) civilians were killed because of their 
perceived or actual behaviors. We coded 18 separate categories of behaviors that motivated 
killings. Over half (56.7 percent) of such killings were the resull of either the perception or 
the reality that the victim was active in a paramilitary organization. Civilians were also 
frequently killed because they were believed to be or actually were involved in antisocial 
behavior (6.8 percent of selective violence), informing (5.8 percent of selective violence), 
political activism (5 .6 percent of selective violence), or providing services to an opponent (4.5 
percent). Excombatanls were also often targeted (5 .6 percent of selective violence). With one 
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Table I. Lethal Political Violence against Civilians by Perpetrator and Type 
Select Colhltenl Cllteeo.-ical I ndisc.-iminllte Total 
N N N N N 
(row %) (row %) (row %) (row %) (col. %) 
NI Security Forces 268 44 45 0 357 
(75.1 %) (12 .3%) ( 12.6%) (0.0'10) (14.1%) 
Loyalists 306 6 1 556 27 950 
(32.2%) (6.4%) (58.5%) (2.8%) (37.5%) 
NISF and Loyalist 33 5 90 2 130 
(25.4%) (3.8%) (69.2%) (1.5%) (5.1%) 
Republicans 607 21 8 222 47 1.094 
(55.5%) ( 19.9%) (20.3%) (4.3%) (43.2%) 
Total 1.214 328 913 76 2,531 
(48.0%) (13.0%) (36.1%) (3.0'/.) (100.0%) 
NoleS: Includes the dealhs of civilian combatanls. 
exception, these behaviors were directly related to contention. Individual civilians were fre-
quently targeted for their perceived or actual involvement in anlisocial bebaviors. In a context 
wbere actors are armed to the teeth and paramililary organizations assume responsibilily for 
nonn enforcement in areas that security forces are unwelcomed, civilians are more likely to 
pay lhe ultimate price for disturbing the apolitical social order in their communities. 
An additional 13 % of civilians killed between 1966 and 2006 died because they were in 
the immediate proximity of armed contention. Of the 328 inslances of lethal collateral politi-
cal violence identified, most civilians (82 %) were killed during operalions eitber targeling 
combatants (66.2 %) or noncombatants (15 .8 %). The remainder were killed either because 
guns or explosives accidentally went off during robberies or at security force checkpoints. 
The results in table I provide important correclives to the most popular misconceptions 
of polilical violence against civilians during the Troubles. The majority of civilian deaths 
were closely tied to contention. Focusing primarily upon categorical political violence ignores 
tbe prevalence of political violence based upon tbe perceived or aclual behaviors of civilians, 
as well as their physical proximity to contention. This is nol 10 say, however, thai categorical 
political violence did nol frequently take place. On the contrary. over one-third (36.1 %) of 
deaths involved civi lians who were targeted for no apparent reason other than their ethno-
nationalisl affilialion. Findings presented below demons Irate how conlenlion-related faclors 
provide strong indicators of categorical political violence against civilians. 
Table I reveals not only multiple lypes of political violence against civilians, but also 
violent propensities according 10 political aclors. Republicans engaged in higher levels of both 
seleclive and collateral polilical violence than either Loyalists or Northern Ireland Security 
Forces. Moreover, Loyalists engaged in more categorical political violence than either Repub-
licans or Northern Ireland Security Forces. Wben including killings involving collusion with 
security forces, nearly lhree-fiftbs (59.2 percent) of killings by Loyalisis randomly targeted 
Catholic civilians. In contrast, less than one quarter (20.3 percent) of Republican killings of 
civilians randomly targeted Protestants . These variations across political actors can be ex-
plained by contention-related factors, to which we now tum our attention. 
Strategy and Lethal Political Violence against Civilians 
We hypothesized that changes in the stralegies of combatants would produce changes in 
the levels and forms of political violence against civi lians not directly participating in armed 
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Figure I. Republican Killings of Civilians by Type 
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conflict (see H3). Figure I presents fonns of lethal political violence against noncombatant 
civilians by Republicans over a 40·year period. The figure shows considerable variation in 
both the levels and predominant fonns of Republican political violence against civilians over 
the course of the Troubles. With the exception of indiscriminate political violence, which 
appears only sporadically, there is an overall downward trend for each fonn of political 
violence against civilians. This trend closely mirrors the Provisional IRA's strategic shifl from 
an all out offensive (1970-1977) to a " long war" strategy of protracted, low·intensity conflict 
(1978·1992), and fmally, to a move away from anned struggle (1992-present). 
Cbanges in the type of political violence against civilians perpetrated by Republicans 
were tightly coupled with shifts in the Provisional IRA's strategy. In 1975, negotiations with 
the British government failed to produce tangible progress towards reunification. A near year-
long ceasefire also contributed to the permanent demobilization of a large number of volun-
teers. At the same time, the British government managed to create several infonnants within 
the ranks of the organization. Collectively, these developments prompted a change in strategy 
in 1977. Abandoning conventional brigades, the IRA was reorganized into cell structures to 
reduce the likelihood of infiltration. Rather than trying to score a decisive, inunediate victory 
by making Northern Ireland ungovernable and destabilizing the economy, the goal was to win 
through a long war of attrition. As a result, operations became more selective and focused 
upon combatant targets. Lethal categorical political violence went from a high of forty civil-
ians in 1976 to four civilians in 1977. Similarly, lethal collateral political violence decreased 
from 24 civilians in 1976 to 4 civilians in 1977. At the same time, lethal selective political 
violence against civilian noncombatanlS increased from 18 in 1976 to 21 civilians in 1977. 
The year 1993 marked the start of an decline in both selective and categorical killings by 
Republicans. The timing reflects the decision by the Anny Council to signal their willingness 
to become involved in peace negotiations. During a speech on December 16, 1992, British 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, indicated the possibility of including 
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Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) in future talks on the constitut ional status of 
Northern [reland. A little over a week later the [RA declared a three-day ceasefire, marking 
the first in a series of ceasefires that eventually culminated in the complete decommissioning 
of [RA weaponry by September of2005. 
The spike in indiscriminate political violence in [998 is accounted for by one bombing by 
Real IRA- an organization opposed to tbe Belfast Good Friday Peace Agreement. By all ac-
counts, this effort to undermine the Agreement had the opposite effect, reminding former 
combatants and the general public of the costs of an alternative to a negotiated compromise. 
Overall, the results underscore the importance of the strategies of combatants to under-
standing levels and forms of political violence against civilians. We now look at several factors 
influencing the strategies of combatants, starting with the means of contention. 
Means of Contention 
Table 2 presents the findings from month-level time series regressions of different types 
of lethal political violence against civilians on select independent variables. In addition to 
independent variables included in most time-series analyses of political violence in Northern 
Ireland (White 1993; Sullivan 1998; Maney 2007), we include measures for levels of usage of 
both discriminate weaponry (firearms) and indiscriminate weaponry (explosive devices). 
Table 2, Unstandardized Coefficients for Time Series Regressions of Lethal Violence against 
Civilians on Selected Independent Variables: February 1966 to December 2006 
Selective Collateral Categorical Indiscriminate 
Killinl!s Killinl!:s KilliDl~s Killi • •• 
Dependent Variable (lagged) .036 -.298 .042 -.220 
(I. 72) (-4.59)'" ( 1.68) (-7.54)'" 
Repressive Capacity -.000 -.001 -.000 -.000 
(-0.73) (-2.90)" (-3.37)" (-0.51 ) 
(Repressive Capacityf x 10-6 .000 .001 .002 .000 
(0.76) (2.66)" (3.74)'" (0.34) 
Truce -.059 1.155 .463 .690 
(-0.31) (2.05)' (1.74) ( 1.23) 
Percent Unemployed .058 .101 .046 .035 
(4.04)'" (2.23), (1.73) (0.82). 
Discriminate Weaponry -.000 -.000 .000 .000 
(-1.07) (0.32) (0.46) (0.80) 
Indiscriminate Weaponry .001 .004 .002 .001 
(3.93)''' (3.89)'" (5.04)'" (1.15) 
Constant .395 7.281 5.018 .262 
(0.19) (2.94)" (2.22)' (OJO) 
R' .26 .25 .29 .07 
B-G LM SIal. (D-W SIaL) 1.13 (1.97) 0.0 1 (1.99) 
Number of cases 455 455 455 455 
Estimation technique Neg. Binomial P-WAR(I) Neg. Binomial P-WAR(I) 
Robust SE SSE Rob. SE Robust SE SSE Rob. SE 
Noles: I p < .05 , II P < .01 iii P < .001 (one-tai led). Excludes deaths of combalant civilians. Independent variables are 
lagged one month . The Breusch-Godfrcy test (8-G LM Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in Ordinary Least 
Squares regressions. The Durbin-Watson test (D·W Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in P-W AR(I) 
regressions. Negative binomial regressions arc used in cases where no serial correlation was detected. Instances of 
serial correlation are remedied using the Prais·Winslen transformed regression estimator fP-W AR(I)]. Numbers in 
parentheses are z·scores for negative binomial regressions and t-scores for Prais-Winsten regressions. 
40 Mobilization 
The analysis supports our expectation that the increased availability of less discriminating 
weaponry increases political violence against civilians (see H4). The number of explosive 
devices used had a strong, positive relationship to levels of selective killings, collateral 
killings, and categorical killings' The findings underscore the way contention type impacts 
levels of political violence against civilians. 
Allies and Opponents 
Are civilians located in areas characterized by high levels of direct participation and in-
direct support for paramilitary organizations more likely to be victims of categorical political 
violence? The inclusion of location measures required switching from time series data to data 
where individual civilian deaths constitute the unit of analysis. We ran logit models for lethal 
categorical political violence by type of actor on select independent variables. Table 3 pre-
sents the findings. 
The location of civilians in paramilitary strongholds was significantly related to lethal 
categorical political violence by Republicans, Loyalists, and Security Forces. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 5 and the idea that combatants attempt to raise the costs to civilians complicit with 
opponents, Loyalists and Security Forces frequently targeted civilians in areas characterized 
by high levels of participation in and support for Republican paramilitary organizations. The 
flipside of punishing civilians complicit with opponents is protecting civilians in allied areas. 
Northern lreland security forces were significantly less likely to kill civilians in Loyalist 
paramilitary strongholds. 
Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients for Logistic Regressions of Lethal Categorical Political 
Violence against Civilians by Specific Perpetrators on Selected lndependent Variables 
LCPVC LCPVC LCPVC 
bI Re2ublicans bI LOIaU.t. bl: Securitl: Forces 
PIRA All Out Offensive .555 .456 1.995 
(2.59)" (4.04)"" (6.25)",' 
Truce .712 · .081 .235 
(4.09)'" (·0.60) (0.99) 
Exclusive Peace Processes .059 .424 .295 
(0.30) (3.82)," (1.4 1 ) 
Belfast GF Agreement • 1.359 • 
(3 .50)," 
Loyalist Stronghold .183 .580 · 1.044 
(1.01) (4.63)'" (.2.84)"' 
Republican Stronghold · .913 .241 1.001 
(-4.51 )"" (2.21)' (4.97)'" 
Constant ·2.533 ·1.339 -4.605 
(.14.83)"" (-13.55)"" (.14.71)"" 
Pseudo Rl .05 .04 .15 
Number of cases 1,861 1,89 1 1,861 
Estimation technique Logi! Robust SE Logi! Robus! SE Logi! Robust SE 
Noles: ' p < .OS, Ii P < ,01 hi P < .001 (one-tailed). Excludes deaths of combatanl civilians and deaths taking place 
oUlSide of the island of lreland. Numbers in parentheses arc Z-SCOre5. 
" Variable was excluded because it predicts failure perfectly. Deaths taking placc during negotiation and ratification 
of the agreement were dropped from the analysis. 
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Catholic civilians' presence in Loyalist paramilitary strongholds also increased their like-
lihood of being killed. The finding may reflect attempts by Loyalist paramilitaries to reduce 
negative sanctioning for lethal categorical violence. Killing complicit civilians in one's own 
area decreased the likelihood of encountering armed Republican patrols protecting their 
strongholds as well as the likelihood of civilians coming forward as witnesses. The killings 
might also have been part of efforts to secure territorial control by forcibly excluding Cath-
olics from Loyalist neighborhoods.' 
Inconsistent with our hypothesis, lethal categorical political violence by Republicans was 
not significantly related to a civilian's location in a Loyalist paramilitary stronghold. More-
over, unlike Loyalists, Republicans were significantly less likely to kill Protestant civilians 
located in Republican strongholds. We attribute these anomalous findings to collective iden-
tity differences among the combatants. 
Collective Identities of Combatants 
We expected combatants drawing inclusive identity boundaries to be less likely to engage 
in categorical political violence against complicit civilians than combatants drawing exclusive 
identity boundaries (see H6). Consistent with this expectation, categorical political violence 
constituted 20.3 percent of lethal violence against civilians by Republicans compared to 59.2 
percent of lethal violence against civilians by Loyalists ' Loyalists generally view the mainly 
Catholic Nationalist popUlation as complicit in Republican paramilitary operations and unlikely 
to ever be convinced to support Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom. In 
contrast, to engage in higher levels of categorical violence would severely undermine the 
credibility of claims by Republicans that they are engaged in a nonsectarian, anticolonial liber-
ation struggle. The results suggest that collective identities play critical roles in political vio-
lence against civilians. 
Dynamics of Contention 
To ascertain whether or not combatants influenced one another's behaviors, we ran time 
series regressions that include lagged measures of lethal political violence against civilians 
committed by other actors. We used the Akaike Information Criterion to select the appropriate 
time lag for each model . Table 4 presents the results. 
The findings are mostly consistent with our expectation that combatants reciprocate 
major escalating and de-escalating actions by opponents (see H7). Lethal violence against 
noncombatant civilians by Republicans was positively related to lethal violence against non-
combatant civilians by Loyalists (and vice versa). Loyalists and Security Forces escalated 
political violence against noncombatant civilians during, and likely in response to, the PIRA 's 
all out offensive strategy of the early to mid-1970s. Conversely, Loyalists responded to PlRA 
cease fires by significantly decreasing their killings of noncombatant civilians. The results 
suggest to us that both Loyalists and Republicans used noncombatant civilian killings as ways 
to raise the costs offurther civilian killings by their opponents. A series oftit-for-tat responses 
often resulted in an outward spiral of political violence against civilians. 
It is important to note, however, that security forces did not immediately and significantly 
alter their levels of political violence against noncombatant civilians in response to civilian 
killings by either RepUblicans or Loyalists. In a month-level regression of all political deaths 
in Northern Ireland, Maney (2007: 83) found that increases in killings by Republicans were 
positively related to subsequent killings by Security Forces. The combination of these results 
and the findings in table 4 raises the possibility that political violence against civilians by 
Security Forces was more likely to be affected by Republican killings of security personnel 
than Republican killings of civilians. Such a relationship would not be surprising given the 
presence of large numbers of British soldiers who were not from either Loyalist or Republican 
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Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients for Time-Series Regressions of Lethal Political 
Violence against Civilians by Specific Perpetrator: January 2, 1966 to December 31 , 2006 
PlRA All Out Offensive 
Truce 
Exclusive Peace Processes 
Belfast Good Friday Agreement 
LPVNC by Republicans 
LPVNC by Loyalists 
LPVNC by Security Forces 
Constant 
Pseudo II' 
B-G LM Stat. (D-W Stat.) 
Number of lags on IV ARs Q 










































































NOles: • p < .05, it P < .01 ... p < .001 (one-tailed). Excludes deaths of combatant civilians. The Breusch-Godfrcy test 
(B-G LM Stat.) is used to detcct serial correlation in Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The Durbin-Watson lest (O-
W Stat.) is used to detect serial correlation in poW AR(I) regressions. Numbers in parentheses arc z-seores. Cases of 
collusion between Loyalists and Security Forces arc excluded to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
" Independent variables are lagged. Number of lags determined using tbe Akaike Information Criterion . 
areas. A lack of identification with either ethnonationalist group could explain a lack of a 
concerted response. Unfortunately, our data does not include a measure for deaths of Security 
Force members. Further research is needed on this subject. 
Peace processes had important effects upon levels of lethal political violence against 
civilians. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, killings of noncombatant civilians by both Loyalists 
and Republicans increased significantly during peace processes that excluded them. Con-
versely, Republican violence against civilians decreased significantly during the one peace 
process that included them- the process culminating in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement 
(BGFA). Reflecting the lower degree of Unionist support for the negotiations and their 
outcome, there was no significant relationship between civilian killings by Loyalists and the 
BGFA. Nonetheless, the finding that Loyalist killings of civilians was not positively related to 
a peace process that included them is a noteworthy departure from responses to past peace 
processes that excluded them. Reflective of the British government's efforts to maximize 
public support for peace processes, civilian killings by security forces significantly decreased 
regardless of whether or not peace processes were inclusive of paramilitary groups. Overall, 
the findings suggest that negotiation is more effective than repression in reducing political 
violence against civilians by paramilitary organizations. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Unfortunately, recent academic studies are characterized by a lack of consensus on how to 
define terrorism. Ironically, they also give prevalence to monocausal explanations that are 
strangely reminiscent of early, now-discarded social movement theories. Drawing on con-
temporary theories and methods from social movement research and from peace and conflict 
studies, we have suggested a contention-oriented approacb that broadens our understanding of 
political violence against civilians. Both fields sensitize us to the relevance of discourse to 
power and resistance. Accordingly, we jettison the concept of terror in favor of the concept of 
political violence of civilians. This alternative terminology not only facilitates a greater 
degree of analytic neutrality, it also assists in the recognition of multiple types of perpetrators 
and different motivations for why civilians are killed. 
We propose four types of political violence against civilians- selective, collateral, cate-
gorical . and indiscriminate. Our quantitative analysis of civilian deaths over the course of 
forty years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland indicates large numbers of killings in three of 
the four categories by both state and nonstate actors. Illustrating the folly of monocausal, 
static explanations, these analyses provide strong empirical support for: (1) a wide range of 
reasons why civilians are killed; (2) variations in the types of political violence against civil-
ians committed by different combatants; and (3) cbanges over time in the forms of political 
violence against civilians that dominate contention. 
The findings demonstrate the insights provided by a contention-oriented approach. In 
contrast to popular portrayals of ethnonationalist violence against civilians as primarily, if not 
exclusively, sectarian, the majority of civilians killed during the Troubles were either targeted 
because of their behaviors (perceived or actual) or were killed because of their pbysical 
proximity to contention or combatants. Several different behaviors resulted in civilians being 
frequently killed-above all, the perception or the reality that the civilian was directly involved 
in armed struggle. 
Like other types of social movements, armed ethnonationalist movements developed and 
implemented strategies over the course of contention. These strategies can critically affect 
levels and forms of violence against civilians. For instance, an end to an all-out offensive by 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the mid-1970s resulted in significant reductions in 
all forms of political violence against civilians, particularly collateral and categorical forms. 
As social movement scholars increasingly revisit the subject of strategy, we should apply new 
insights to understanding political violence. 
By affecting the formation and implementation of the strategies of combatants, several 
other factors influenced the killings of civilians. Surprisingly little scholarly allention has been 
devoted to the relationship between weapons technologies and forms of terrorism against 
civilians. The use of indiscriminate weapons was significantly related to multiple fonns of 
political violence against civilians. The rmdings have important practical implications for 
security strategies. In particular, when civilians' lives are given higher priority than the lives 
of security forces (which our analysis above suggests may not always be the case), then 
security forces are better advised to concentrate their investigative efforts on finding ex-
plosives rather than upon finding firearms. While televised displays of seizures of large arms 
caches plays well with the media and the general public, they put uninvolved civilians more in 
harm's way if they divert resources away from seizing explosives. The feeling of greater 
security among the populace generated by these images actually is diametrically opposed to 
the reality of greater insecurity. 
Our analysis adds nuance to the assertion that complicit civilians are more likely to be 
victims of categorical political violence. As expected, Catholic civilians located in Republican 
paramilitary strongholds were more likely to be randomly killed by Loyalists and Security 
Forces than civilians elsewhere. Protestant civilians located in Loyalist paramilitary slrong-
holds, however, were not significantly more likely to be randomly killed by Republicans. 
44 Mobili=atio1l 
Moreover, Protestant civilians were less likely to be killed in Republican strongholds. The 
results underscore the importance of collective identity to explaining political violence against 
civilians. Whereas neither Loyalists nor Republicans could reasonably expect to form allian-
ces with civilians having opposing ethnonationalist affiliations, Loyalists engaged in cate-
gorical violence to a far greater extent than RepUblicans. The findings are consistent with the 
more inclusive identity boundaries drawn by Republicans. They also underscore the need for 
social movement scholars studying the dynamics of contention to pay closer auention to 
symbolic factors. For peace scholars, the results affirm the importance of identity transform-
ation to the reduction of intergroup violence. 
This is not to say that combatants do not influence one another's behaviors. Loyalists and 
Republicans frequently reciprocated each other's increases and decreases in civilian killings. 
Both Loyalists and Security Forces negatively sanctioned the Provisional IRA's all-out of-
fensive by significantly increasing categorical violence. The results underscore a recurrent 
theme in peace and conflict studies, namely how defensive effons to deter attacks on civilians 
by opponents can result in a rapid increase in political violence. Conversely, both sets of actors 
positively sanctioned PIRA ceasefires by decreasing categorical violence. So while com-
batants can inadvertently reinforce political violence against civilians through their effons at 
deterrence, they also have the agency to break the cycle by ending reciprocal violence. 
Our findings suggest that the hegemonic political discourse of not negotiating with 
terrorists can, if implemented as policy, contribute to sustained paramilitary violence against 
civilians. The ftrst four major initiatives at a negotiated political seulement in Northern 
Ireland were exclusive of political parties associated with paramilitary organizations. Both 
Republicans and Loyalists significantly intensified their auacks on civilians during these 
peace processes. In contrast, Republicans, on the whole, decreased their attacks on civilians 
during the peace process that resulted in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement- a process that 
was inclusive of Sinn Fein, the political party supportive of the Irish Republican Army. 
Moreover, categorical violence by Loyalists did not significantly increase as it had in past 
pcace processes. The results lend compelling quantitative support to an important finding 
from comparative historical research: peace processes are less likely to succeed if they ex-
clude those who are capable of spoiling the process by auacking civilians. 
Similar types of analyses are needed to determine the external validity of the findings for 
this case. Continuous, longitudinal measures related to other potential sources of political 
violence against civilians such as high levels of nonviolent protests, inflammatory media 
coverage, polarized cross~ommunity attitudes, industrial unrest, high levels of residential 
segregation, and low levels of exogamy were not available in this case, but could be acces-
sible to scholars studying other cases. In panicular, we call for closer aUention to the 
relationship between nonviolent protests and armed rebellion and how this relationship 
influences levels and fonns o f political violence against civilians. Such studies of contention 
are badly needed if we are to go beyond impressionistic and polemical studies to gain a 
nuanced understanding of phenomena that have such negative social consequences. 
APPENDIX A: 
LIST OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: Indiscriminate political violence against civilians will take place the leas\. 
Hypothesis 2: Over the course of a cycle of contention, selective and collateral political 
violence will constitute large percentages of civilian victims. 
Hypothesis 3: Major changes in the strategies of combatants are likely to lead to significant 
changes in the levels and types or political violence perpetrated against civilians. 
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Hypothesis 4: The increased availability of less discriminating weaponry increases all forms 
of political violence against civilians. 
Hypothesis 5: Civilians in areas providing high levels of support for an armed actor are more 
likely to be victims of categorical political violence. 
Hypothesis 6: Combatants with more inclusive collective identities will be less likely to 
engage In categorical political violence than combatants with more exclusive collective 
identities. 
Hypothesis 7: Major, sustained increases or decreases in polilical violence against civilians 
by an armed actor are likely to be reciprocated by opponents. 
Hypothesis 8: Categorical political violence increases during peace processes largely 
exclusive of paramilitary organizations and decreases during peace processes mostly inclusive 
of paramilitary organizations. 
APPENDIX B: 
GLOSSARY OF CASE-SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY' 
Term Definition 
Loyalists Militant Unionists 
Nationalists Mostly Catholic; favor the reunification of Ireland 
Northern Ireland Six of the thirty.two counties of the island of Ireland that are linked politically 
with Great Britain as pan of the United Kingdom. The other twenty·six counties 
arc known as the Republic of Ireland. which was declared a so\'ereign, 
independent, democratic state in the 1937 constitution and declared a Republic 
by act of parliament in 1949. 
Panition Political separation of Nonhern Ireland from the rest of Ireland; established 
under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish (Irish Free 
State) Treaty of 1921. 
Republicans Militant Nationalists 
Reunification Ending the panition of Ireland and returning to the rule of Ireland as one political 
unit as had becn the case prior to the early 1920s. 
Unionists Mostly Protestant; favor retaining the existing status of Northern Ireland as part 
of the United Kingdom. 
APPENDIX C: 
DISCUSSION OF REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS AND REMEDIES' 
Where possible, the Breusch-Godfrey test was used to detect serial correlation. Unlike the 
Durbin Watson statistic, the test detects higher order correlations and can be used on 
regression models that include lagged endogenous variables (Greene 2000: 540; Ostrom 1990: 
65). Instances of serial correlation were remedied by performing the Hildreth and Lu pro-
cedure for searching for a value of p that minimizes the error sum of squares for transformed 
equations. The procedure beuer approximates the maximum likelihood estimator of p 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998: 164). Without Hildreth-Lu, various transformation procedures 
experienced difficulties in converging in cases when the value of p was large. We opted for 
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the Prais-Winsten transfonnation because the Corchrane-Orcutt method negatively affects 
estimator efficiency by discarding the initial observation in the data set (Greene 2000: S47). 
The Cook-Weisberg test was used to check for heteroscedasticity. We used a Huber-White 
sandwich estimator in cases of unequal error variances. Our decision to use this estimator 
reflects the trend away from weighted least squares and other complex corrective procedures 
(Greene 2000: 522). 
NOTES 
I While the concept of "state terrorism" helps somewhat to correct the imbalance, the disproportionate access of 
political elites 10 mass communications means that nonstate actors will likely come to mind firs t when the term 
"terrorism" is read or heard. 
2 As wilh the concept of "Ierror," the term "collateral damage" forms part of a discourse thaI legitimates political 
\'iolence by Slale actors. We cboose to usc the term collateral violence instead to highlight the physical harm to 
humans. The lerm collateral is retained as it emphasizes the discrepancy between intent and outcome. We 
disassociate ourselves from the idea that a lack of intent to inflict barm upon civilians exonerates perpetrators from 
legal and ethical responsibilities to protect civilians. 
1 Jeff Goodwin (2006) uses the tcnru categorical terrorism and indiscriminate terrorism interchangeably. In this 
article, we make a distinction between these tenns to emphasize that categorical violence is to a certain degree 
discriminating in that a civilian is targeted based upon their perceived affiliation with a collectivity. 
' The exception was indiscriminate violence where only the lagged dependent variable was significantly related. The 
model 's lack of predictive power is not surprising given the infrequent and sporadic occurrence of indiscriminate 
killings (see table 1 and figure I). 
S We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. 
6 The percentage for Loyalists includes kil.lings involving collusion with security forces. 
7 Much of this appendix appeared in Maney (2007) . 
• Much of trus appendix appeared in Maney (2001). 
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